Shaking Up Pharmaceutical Marketing to Physicians: $3Billion Settlement Imposed Standards and Transparency Far Beyond Sunshine Act

sunsetWhile the headlines reported colorful allegations of kickbacks to physicians, such as Hawaiian vacations and Madonna tickets, and the stunning magnitude of the largest healthcare fraud settlement and payment by a drug company , the most significant aspect of the $3 Billion settlement by global pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline LLC (GSK) was the Corporate Integrity Agreement  (CIA), which restructures its sales and promotion practices.  The alleged misconduct involved “off-label” drug promotions (recommendations to use medicines for different conditions and patients than the FDA approved), payment of kickbacks, making false and misleading statements concerning the safety of Avandia, and reporting false “best prices” in order to underpay rebates owed under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program.

With the theme “patients before profits, science before sales” the government set about to restructure GSK’s marketing practices in significant ways.  In addition to changing its incentive compensation practices, such that executive bonuses are now required to be clawed back for regulatory compliance failures, and field representative compensation must be based on service quality rather than sales volume, the 123-page CIA outlines a major overhaul of GSK’s physician arrangements policies and procedures.

Physicians and hospitals/academic medical centers may obtain remuneration from drug companies under any number of arrangements, including consulting agreements, speaker programs, service on advisory boards, research, publication activities, and grants for medical education activities.  Concern that these payments may undermine medical judgment or scientific independence led Congress to adopt the “Physician Payments Sunshine Act” reporting requirements, which go into effect on  January 1, 2013.  CMS blogged that the final rule will come later this year.  In the meantime, however, the CIA goes far beyond requiring the transparency of monetary payments. It requires that each type of physician relationship involving compensation be conducted in such a manner as to promote compliance with federal standards.

Physicians should see the following changes, among others, in their relationships with GSK and possibly with other companies that read the CIA as “a word to the wise” and adopt similar compliance practices voluntarily:

  • Physicians will receive a letter from GSK describing the allegations, the settlement, and requesting that physicians report inappropriate promotion of products or other questionable conduct;
  • Any requests by physicians for information on “off-label” uses of drugs will be required to be put in writing, confirming what information was requested, whether or not the request was unsolicited, signed by the medical professional, referred to the Medical Affairs Department, and all such requests for information will be tracked internally at GSK;
  • Drug company sales and field reps may be accompanied by monitors who will observe their meetings with health care providers and assess the promotional materials distributed;
  • Speakers at programs will be required to have compliance training and written agreements describing the scope of the work, speaker fees to be paid (fair market value with annual caps), compliance obligations. In addition, their programs will be monitored and their fees reported on the GSX website;
  • Samples, coupons, and vouchers for drugs will be distributed only to the medical specialty or types of clinical practices for which the drug’s use has been approved;
  • Researchers will have written agreements describing the scope of clinical research or other work, fees based on a pre-set rate structure, and compliance obligations;
  • Physicians who sit on drug formulary boards or who develop clinical guidelines will be required to disclose their financial relationships with GSK; and
  • Sponsorship or funding of grants to healthcare-related organizations in support of educational programs will be limited. The programs must be non-promotional and accurate in nature, and financial relationships with teaching faculty will be disclosed,.

It is important that the health care provider community as well as drug and medical device manufacturers read this CIA in order to have a clear understanding of what the Office of the Inspector General and the FDA expect.  Both business practices and compliance programs may need to be modified or enhanced to address financial incentives related to promotional and scientific activities that could compromise high quality patient care.  Transparency of financial arrangements is useful to raise the question of whether benefits have influenced physician judgment, but this CIA seeks to reform the underlying industry marketing, research, and compensation practices that drive many manufacturers’ arrangements with physicians.

EEOC's New Focus on Systemic Discrimination Litigation

Congress requires executive departments, governmental corporations, and independent agencies to develop and post a strategic plan on their public websites every five years.  These plans are supposed to direct the agency’s work and lay the foundation for the development of more detailed annual plans, budgets, and related program performance information.  Earlier this year, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) released its Strategic Plan for 2012-2016.

EEOC listed increasing the number of systemic discrimination lawsuits against employers as a top priority.  Systemic litigation involves an allegation of a pattern or practice of discrimination or class discrimination.  Stated in other words, a case of systemic discrimination involves wrongful conduct that impacts a group of individuals as opposed to a single individual.  It may involve, for example, a preference for younger workers in the hiring process, a glass ceiling preventing women from advancing within an organization, or a sick time policy that results in a failure to accommodate individuals with disabilities.  By pursuing this strategy, EEOC seems to be saying that it is seeking more bang from its litigation buck.

Employers need to be aware that EEOC will likely seek to enlarge the scope of some otherwise single-complaint investigations where the facts that it discovers may support an allegation that systemic discrimination is occurring.  This is particularly the case where an employer’s rule or policy has broad company-wide impact upon more employees than simply the individual who brought the initial charge.

States Move to Limit Employer Access to Social Media Accounts

Social networking sites have become a popular tool for employers seeking information about job applicants.  In the wake of media coverage detailing the conduct of certain employers who were requesting the social media passwords of job applicants, several states, including New York, have seen legislation introduced banning the practice.

On April 13, 2012, New York State Senator Liz Krueger sponsored and introduced a bill that would prohibit employers, as well as their agents or representatives, from requiring employees or job applicants to disclose log-in names, passwords or other means for accessing a personal social media account or device.  The legislation would also prohibit employers from discharging, disciplining or otherwise penalizing an employee, or refusing to hire a job applicant, based on his or her refusal to provide such information.  Employers found in violation of this law would be subject to a fine of $300.00 for a first offense, and $500.00 for each subsequent offense.

On May 2, 2012, Maryland became the first state to enact legislation that prohibits employers from requesting the social media passwords or accessing the social media of prospective and current employees.  Similar legislation is pending in several other states, and efforts are underway to introduce federal legislation that would prohibit employers from asking for the social media passwords of employees or applicants.

Needless to say, the world of social media and networking is changing rapidly.  As employers and legislators react to employers’ utilization of information secured from such sites, employers need to exercise caution in using social media to screen applicants.  Should an employer choose to do so, it should put in place a clear policy on the use of social media checks and monitor developments in this area of the law.

EEOC Guidance Reminds Employers That Criminal Screening Must Be Job-Related

On April 25, 2012, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued an updated Enforcement Guidance on employer use of arrest and conviction records in employment decisions, addressing both disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination based on criminal background checks.

EEOC noted that “[w]hile Title VII does not prohibit an employer from requiring applicants or employees to provide information about arrests, convictions or incarceration, it is unlawful to discriminate in employment based on race, color, national origin, religion or sex.”  Noting that national data existed that criminal record exclusions have a disparate impact based on race and national origin, EEOC’s recently-issued guidance focused on employment discrimination based on these factors and explained how such discrimination could arise:  (1) a Title VII violation may occur when an employer treats criminal history information differently for different applicants or employees, based on their race or national origin (disparate treatment liability); and (2) an employer’s neutral policy (i.e., excluding applicants from employment based upon certain criminal conduct) may disproportionately impact some individuals protected under Title VII, and may violate the law if not job-related and consistent with business necessity (disparate impact liability).

EEOC noted that, in disparate impact cases, an employer will be able to meet the “job-related and consistent with business necessity defense” when it is able to show that its policy “operates to effectively link specific criminal conduct, and its dangers, with the risks inherent in the duties of a particular position.”  Two circumstances where EEOC believes this standard will be “consistently met” are when:  (1) the employer validates the criminal conduct exclusion using EEOC’s Uniform Guidelines on Employee Protection Procedures (designed to provide a framework for employers by setting forth the acceptable use of testing and other selection procedures); and (2) the employer develops a targeted screen that considers the nature of the crime, the time elapsed since the crime was committed, and the nature of the job – and then provides an opportunity for an individualized assessment for people excluded by the screen to determine whether the policy, as applied, is job-related and consistent with business necessity.  Although Title VII does not require individualized assessment, the guidance notes that the use of such assessment can help employers avoid Title VII liability.

In addition to this EEOC guidance, New York employers should recall that they must comply with New York Correction Law Article 23-A, which prohibits “unfair discrimination against persons previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses.”  Under Correction Law § 752, an employer cannot deny employment to an individual convicted of a crime unless (1) there is a direct relationship between one or more of the previous offenses and the specific employment sought; and (2) the granting of employment would involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public.

Finally! Social Media Policy Sample Approved by NLRB

On May 30, 2012, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) announced its third report on social media cases, with a particular emphasis on the General Counsel’s findings that several employers’ social media policies were overbroad and therefore unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act.   Six policies are quoted in detail, and the defects in the policies elucidated. 

However, one employer’s social media policy (as revised) was determined to be acceptable, and is appended to the NLRB report at pages 22-23.   The acceptable sample contains warnings such as “before creating online content, consider some of the risks and rewards involved.  Keep in mind that any of your conduct that adversely affects your job performance…or otherwise adversely affects …Employer’s legitimate business interests may result in disciplinary action up to and including termination.”  So, even though the NLRB report concluded that it was unlawfully vague to tell employees, as one employer did, not to post “offensive, demeaning, abusive or inappropriate remarks,” on the grounds that this flawed provision could discourage protected communication among workers about working conditions, there are a number of more precise and permissible ways for employers to communicate to employees that appropriate conduct is required in social media venues.  The approved social media policy sample published by the NLRB is an invaluable resource for employers.

Fair Labor Standards Act: Rounding Hours Worked

The federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires covered employers to pay non-exempt employees overtime pay for all hours worked over forty (40) hours in a given workweek.  The failure to count all hours, or portions thereof, can result in an overtime pay violation because employers have not fully accounted for hours worked in excess of forty (40) during the workweek. 

Many employers track employee hours worked in fifteen (15) minute increments, and the FLSA allows an employer to round employee time to the nearest quarter hour.  However, an employer may violate the FLSA’s overtime pay requirement if the employer always rounds down when the employee works less than a full fifteen-minute increment.  Employee time for one to seven minutes may be rounded down and not counted towards the employee’s hours worked, but employee time for eight to fourteen minutes must be rounded up and counted as a quarter hour of worked time.  See 29 CFR § 785.48(b). 

In a fact sheet explaining common FLSA violations that were discovered by the United States Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) during investigations that it conducted in the health care industry, the WHD provided the following examples of how an employer can round an employee’s hours worked: 

Example #1:

An intermediate care facility docks employees by a full quarter hour (15 minutes) when they start work more than seven minutes after the start of their scheduled shift.  Does this practice comply with the FLSA requirements?  Yes, as long as the employees’ time is rounded up a full quarter hour when the employee starts working from 8 to 14 minutes before their shift or if the employee works from 8 to 14 minutes beyond the scheduled end of their shift. 

Example #2:

An employee’s schedule is 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., with a thirty minute unpaid lunch break.  The employee receives overtime compensation after working more than forty (40) hours in a workweek.  The employee clocks in 10 minutes early every day and clocks out 7 minutes late each day.  The employer follows the standard rounding rules.  Is the employee entitled to overtime compensation?  Yes.  If the employer rounds back a quarter hour each morning to 6:45 a.m. and rounds back each evening to 3:30 p.m., the employee will show a total of 41.25 hours worked during that workweek.  The employee will be entitled to additional overtime compensation for 1.25 hours.

Example #3:

An employer only records and pays for time if its employees work in full 15 minute increments.  An employee paid $10 per hour is scheduled to work 8 hours a day Monday through Friday, for a total of 40 hours a week.  The employee always clocks out 12 minutes after the end of her shift.  The employee is paid $400 per week.  Does this comply with the FLSA?  No, the employer has violated the overtime requirements.  The employee worked an hour each week (12 minutes times 5) that was not compensated.  The employer owes the employee for one hour of overtime each week.

Social Media Policies: NLRB Issues Guidance

guy at computerOn January 24, 2012, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) released an Operations Management Memo detailing recent agency decisions on whether employees were properly disciplined for social media conduct. The take-away from the NLRB’s web release  is that “employer policies should not be so sweeping that they prohibit the kinds of activity protected by federal labor law, such as the discussion of wages or working conditions among employees.”  This guidance is important to both unionized and non-unionized workplaces, because the NLRB has jurisdiction over all  private-sector and not-for-profit employers whose revenues exceed $250,000, excluding agricultural, railroad and airline employers.

In each case, the employers’ social media and confidentiality policies that had been the basis for employee discipline were reviewed by the NLRB to determine whether these work rules improperly restricted employees' rights to engage in “Section 7” activity under the National Labor Relations Act.  Section 7 activity is concerted employee activity in which an employee initiates or acts with the authority of other employees to address the terms and conditions of employment for the mutual aid and protection of employees.  Where employers were identified as having vague or overbroad policies, the NLRB called for them to include clear definitions, examples of prohibited conduct, and/or limiting language to clarify that the policy did not restrict protected Section 7 concerted activity. 

Below are some examples of the three categories of social media policies - explicitly restrictive of Section 7 rights, overbroad, and lawful/acceptable.  Many of the invalidated provisions will be a surprise to employers, since these provisions are commonly used in social media policies.

A.       Policy failures--explicit restriction of concerted activity:

  • Policy prohibits employees from “making disparaging comments about the company through any media, including online blogs, other electronic media or through the media” [Problem: would reasonably be construed to restrict Section 7 activity.]
  • Policy restricts use of Employer’s confidential and/or proprietary information provided that, in external social networking situations, employees should generally avoid identifying themselves as Employer’s employees, unless there was a legitimate need to do so or when discussing terms and conditions of employment “in an appropriate manner.” [Problem:  Employees have a Section 7 right to discuss their wages and other terms and conditions of employment, and this prohibits “inappropriate” discussions, and “savings clause” seeking to interpret policy so as not interfere with Section 7 rights at the end of the policy did not remove chill and could not be understood to clarify what “inappropriate” discussions were.]
  • Policy prohibited employees from disclosing or communicating confidential, sensitive, or non-public information concerning the company on or through company property to anyone outside the company without prior approval of senior management or the law department.  [Problem:  policy that precludes employees from discussing terms and conditions of employment, or sharing information about themselves or fellow employees with outside parties violates law.]

B.      Policy failures--overbroad language (lacked clear definitions, examples, and limiting language):

  • Policies prohibiting “unprofessional communication,”  “disrespectful conduct,”  “inappropriate conversation,” or “inappropriate postings.”
  • Policy which prohibits employees from using social media to “engage in unprofessional communication that could negatively impact the Employer’s reputation or interfere with the Employer’s mission” or regarding members of the Employer’s community.
  • Policy prohibiting use of company’s name or service marks in social media.  [Reason: employer’s proprietary interests were not implicated by employee’s non-commercial use in Section 7 activity.]

C.      Approved policies:

  • Policy prohibited the use of social media to post or display comments about coworkers or supervisors or the Employer that are vulgar, obscene, threatening, intimidating, harassing, or a violation of the Employer’s workplace policies against discrimination, harassment, or hostility on account of age, race, religion, sex, ethnicity, nationality, disability, or other protected class, status, or characteristic.  [Reason:  prohibited conduct not reasonably understood to restrict Section 7 activity.]
  • Policy that required employees not to refer to the company in social networking if necessary to insure compliance with securities regulations and other laws.
  • Policy that prohibited employees from using or disclosing personal health information about patients.

Because social media law is developing, and involves the application of Federal labor and employment law and administrative agency guidance to specific situations, employers would do well to consult with legal counsel before implementing social media rules/policies,  or enforcing discipline based on those workplace rules.  Our prior blog reviewed the NLRB's first report on its social media decisions.

 

High School Diploma Requirements Must Be Job Related to Withstand ADA Scrutiny

The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)’s Office of Legal Counsel recently issued an informal discussion letter in response to an inquiry as graduatesto whether the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits the State of Tennessee from requiring students with learning disabilities to take “Gateway tests” or “end-of-course assessments” in order to receive their “full” high school diplomas.  The inquiry was apparently prompted by concern that some individuals cannot obtain a high school diploma and, therefore, cannot obtain jobs requiring a high school diploma because their learning disabilities caused them to perform unsatisfactorily on end-of-course assessments.

In the discussion letter, EEOC noted that under the ADA:

[A] qualification standard, test, or other selection criterion, such as a high school diploma requirement, that screens out an individual or a class of individuals on the basis of a disability must be job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.  A qualification standard is job related and consistent with business necessity if it accurately measures the ability to perform the job’s essential functions (i.e. its fundamental duties).  Even where a challenged qualification standard test, or other selection criterion is job related and consistent with business necessity, if it screens out an individual on the basis of disability, an employer must also demonstrate that the standard or criterion cannot be met, and the job cannot be performed, with a reasonable accommodation.

As a result, it is EEOC’s position that, if an employer adopts a high school diploma requirement for a job, and that requirement effectively “screens out” individuals who are unable to graduate because of an impairment that meets the ADA’s definition of “disability,” the employer may not apply the standard unless the employer can demonstrate that the diploma requirement is job related and consistent with business necessity.  The employer will not be able to make this showing, for example, if the job’s essential functions can be performed by someone who does not have a diploma.

The EEOC also noted that, even if the diploma requirement is job related and consistent with business necessity, the employer may still have to determine whether a particular applicant whose learning disability prevents him from meeting the diploma requirement can perform the essential functions of the job, with or without a reasonable accommodation.  It may do so by considering the applicant’s relevant work history and/or by allowing the applicant to demonstrate an ability to do the job’s essential functions during the application process.  However, the employer is not required to prefer the applicant with an impairment over other applicants who are “better qualified.”

Reminder of February 1st Deadline for Employers

The New York Wage Theft Prevention Act went into effect on April 12, 2011.  The act amends New York State’s notice of wage rate requirements and expands the civil and criminal penalties when employers fail to comply with the requirements. 

One of the requirements mandates that employers provide current employees with a notice containing specific wage information on or before February 1st of each year, commencing February 1, 2012.  The information required to be provided in the notice can be found in our blog post from April 2011.  The employee’s acknowledgement of the notification must be signed and dated by him or her and retained by the employer for six (6) years.

The New York State Department of Labor can impose damages upon employers who fail to adhere to the notice requirements in the amount of $50.00 per week, per employee.  If you have any questions about any of the statute’s notice requirements, contact the New York State Department of Labor or legal counsel knowledgeable in this area of the law.

Waiver of Class Action Rights? Consumer Contracts Containing Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Clauses Upheld, but Employment Contract Waivers Struck Down as Violating the National Labor Relations Act

scales of justiceRecently two tribunals have taken a harder look at the waivers of class action rights when they are embedded in different types of "adhesion" contracts.  Evaluating them under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), they reached different results in employment and commercial contracts because federal  labor law protects employee rights to engage in “concerted activities” for the purpose of “mutual aid or protection.” 

Adhesion contracts are agreements resulting from a situation where one side has substantially more bargaining power than the other, and writes an agreement primarily to its own advantage without a realistic opportunity for the other side to negotiate.  If adhesion contracts are extremely unfair, a tribunal may refuse to enforce them as being "unconscionable."  Here, the tribunals (a court and an administrative hearing board) considered the enforceability of class action waivers contained in "standard form" consumer and employment contracts.

Employment contracts:  On January 2, 2012, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued a decision holding that the NLRA was violated when the employer required an employee covered by the act to sign, as a condition of employment, an employment contract with an arbitration clause that precluded employees from filing joint, collective, or class action claims addressing their working conditions in any and all forums, judicial and arbitral. (See D. R. Horton, Inc. and Michael Cuda, 357 NLRB No. 184 (Case 12-CA-25764)).  Employers remain free to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses in employment agreements, and to insist that only individual claims are subject to arbitration, but employers may not compel employees to waive their right to collectively pursue working condition litigation in the courts or through unfair labor practice actions. 

Employers may need to review the arbitration clauses in their employment contracts and revise them so as to limit only individual claims to the arbitration forum.

Commercial contracts:  Commercial contracts of adhesion with generous terms may achieve class action claims waivers and compulsory arbitration, depending on the fairness of the arbitration agreement,  because the FAA pre-empts  state law to the contrary.  In the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011),  a California statute invalidating all consumer arbitration agreements containing class action waivers as  “unconscionable” was found to be pre-empted by the FAA.  Courts must evaluate the agreements to determine if they are fair and reasonable.  The arbitration agreement (containing a class action waiver) which was upheld by the Supreme Court in Concepcion provided several terms worth noting:

  • venue was in the consumer’s county of residence;
  • the company agreed to pay costs for non-frivolous claims and to waive any claims for its own costs and fees;
  • the clauses permitted injunctions and punitive damages and; 
  • if a consumer received an award greater than the company’s last settlement offer, the company would pay a minimum recovery of $7,500 and double the amount of the consumer’s attorney fees. 

Businesses should conduct a cost-benefit analysis and consider providing similarly generous terms in their consumer arbitration clauses in order to obtain class action waivers.

Deadline for Posting NLRB's "Employee Rights Notice" Extended to April 30, 2012

On August 25, 2011, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) announced its final rule related to the Notification of Employee Rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  Under that rule, private-sector employers (including labor unions) whose workplaces fall under NLRA jurisdiction will be required to post a notice of employee rights regarding unionization.  The NLRA covers most private-sector employers.  Excluded from coverage under the NLRA are public-sector employees, agricultural and domestic workers, independent contractors, workers employed by a parent or spouse, employees of air and rail carriers covered by the Railway Labor Act, and supervisory personnel.

The final rule requires the employers whose workplaces fall under NLRA jurisdiction to post and maintain the NLRB notice in conspicuous places and to take “reasonable steps” to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, covered by any other material, or otherwise rendered unreadable.  The proposed rule was to have taken effect on November 14, 2011.  However, in October 2011, the NLRB decided to postpone the implementation date for the notice until January 31, 2012.  Since that time, legal challenges to the rule remain unresolved in federal court.  Consequently, on December 23, 2011, the NLRB agreed to postpone the effective date of the notice-posting to April 30, 2012.  The Board stated that postponing the effective date of the rule would facilitate the resolution of the legal challenges that have been filed with respect to the rule.

sample of the proposed notice language is attached.  Employers should also know that along with the obligation to post the rule will come the right to post a notice to employees of their right to choose not to unionize – however, wording of such notice should be discussed and cleared with legal counsel prior to posting it.

Should Bonuses to Employees Paid in 2012 Be Taxed in 2011?

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On January 1, 2011, the owner of ABC Company (Michael Doe) meets with John Smith and tells him that he will be paid a bonus of $250 for each new client he brings to ABC Company from January 1, 2011 – November 30, 2011 (“Bonus Period”).  On December 5, 2011, Michael tells John he has earned a bonus of $6,250 for the 25 new clients John brought to ABC Company during 2011.  Michael also tells John that his 2011 bonus will be paid in 2012.  ABC Company’s fiscal year is the same as the calendar year and it normally pays all bonuses during the first quarter of its fiscal year.  Do you think the bonus is subject to taxation in 2011 or 2012?  The answer may surprise you.  If ABC Company pays John Smith his bonus by March 15, 2012, the bonus should be taxed in 2012; however, if ABC Company intends to pay the bonus after March 15, 2012, the bonus may be subject to tax in 2011.  Bonuses that are earned in one year and are paid out the next year receive special tax treatment if they are considered “deferred compensation” under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 409A.   

Deferred compensation is compensation that an employee has a legally binding right to receive that is payable to, or on behalf of, an employee in a later year.  Deferred compensation must either be compliant with IRC Section 409A or fit into one of the exceptions in order to avoid potential penalties by the IRS.  One exception is known as the short-term deferral rule.  The short-term deferral rule essentially provides that if deferred compensation is paid within 2 ½ months after the tax year of the employee ends (December 31st) or, if later, 2 ½ months after the employer’s tax year ends, then the deferred compensation is exempt from the rules of IRC Section 409A.  In order for ABC Company to qualify for the short-term deferral exception, it would have to pay John Smith his bonus by March 15, 2012. 

            What happens if John Smith isn’t paid his bonus by March 15, 2012?

If ABC Company does not pay the bonus promised to John Smith by March 15, 2012, the bonus payment will not qualify for the short-term deferral exception and the bonus amount may be immediately subject to federal income tax.  John Smith may have to pay an additional 20% penalty tax on the amount of the bonus plus accrued interest.  Michael should speak with his attorney to determine if payment after March 15, 2012 will result in a violation of IRC Section 409A. 

Even if a bonus were not paid by March 15th, the terms of the bonus arrangement may permit the bonus to be treated as compensation that is exempt from Section 409A, or as deferred compensation that complies with Section 409A.  There may be no legally binding right to be paid which exists in the prior year, there may not be a substantial risk of forfeiture, there may be an appropriate written bonus plan, or there may be other factors present.  This is a complex and comprehensive tax statute, and  each factual situation must be assessed separately to determine regulatory compliance.  Employers should be aware of any instance in which there may be deferred compensation to an employee and consult with an attorney familiar with 409A to ensure payments are made in compliance with this tax law. 

Tips on Drafting an Enforceable Non-Solicitation Clause in New York

In order protect your business, it may be prudent to incorporate a non-solicitation provision into your employment agreements.  This type of restrictive covenant prohibits employees from leaving your company and soliciting your clients or customers.  Careful attention must be given when drafting a non-solicitation covenant because a restriction that is overbroad in its reach will not be enforceable.  The key to drafting an enforceable non-solicitation clause is ensuring that the restraint is not greater than is needed.  In New York, this means that a non-solicitation clause cannot extend to clients with whom the employee never acquired a relationship through the resources provided by the employer, or to clients that the employee developed independently and without the benefit of any expenditure of effort or resources by the employer.  When analyzing the validity of a non-solicitation clause, New York courts also consider: (i) the reasonableness in time and area, (ii) the harm to the general public, and (iii) the burden to the employee. 

Below is an example of a narrowly tailored non-solicitation provision. 

Non-Solicitation Covenant.  Employee agrees that in the event of separation from employment with Employer, whether such separation is voluntary or involuntary, Employee will not, for a period of twenty four (24) months following such separation, directly or indirectly: (i) solicit clients of Employer for the purpose of selling or providing products or services of the type sold or provided by Employee while employed by Employer, or (ii) induce clients or prospective clients of Employer to terminate, cancel, not renew, or not place business with Employer.  This restriction shall apply only to those clients of Employer with which Employee had contact or to those clients or prospective clients of Employer about which Employee obtained confidential information or trade secrets during the last twenty four (24) months of his or her employment with Employer.  For purpose of this paragraph, the term “contact” means interaction between Employee and a client which takes place to further the business relationship, or making (or assisting or supervising the making of) sales to or performing or providing (or assisting or supervising the performance or provision of) services or products for the client on behalf of Employer. 

If you decide to include a non-solicitation clause in your employment agreements, it is important to consult with an attorney to ensure that the provision is drafted in a manner that will withstand judicial scrutiny down the road. 

Diagnostic Testing Center Fined Millions Under False Claims Act For Physician Supervision Failure In Whistleblower Case Brought By Former Employee

On October 21, 2011, the federal district court in Nashville, Tennessee denied an Eighth Amendment “excessive fine” challenge to the judgment entered on August 23, 2011 for $11.1 Million against Medquest Associates Inc. and certain affiliates  (Medquest) in a False Claims Act (FCA) (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 through 3733) whistleblower case.  The U.S. Attorney's Office in Nashville filed the FCA case after it received information from a former Medquest employee who complained to her employer that diagnostic testing was being done either without any physicians at all, or  by physicians who lacked the required certification or specialized training. United States ex. Re. Hobbs v. MedQuest Associates, Inc. et al., No. 3:06-01169 (M.D. Tennesee) 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126539. 

The court held that compensatory damages and penalties were appropriate statutory damages for submitting claims to Medicare for contrast testing done without the physician supervision, and for failing to give CMS notice of a change of ownership and billing under the former owner’s Medicare provider number. The court had decided earlier in the litigation that CMS regulations on physician supervision of diagnostic tests were conditions of payment and that submitting claims for payment without regulatory compliance amounted to a violation of the FCA. 

The damages were calculated by adding the amount of each claim filed with Medicare, plus treble the amount of the claim, plus a per-claim civil penalty of $11,000 for the physician supervision claims and $5,000 for the claims made under the  former operator’s number.  The court held that the assessment of treble damages and civil penalties, with fixed ranges and multipliers keyed to actual harm, was mandatory under the statute, and that the amount calculated by the court was less than the statutory maximum.  The amount of the judgment did not run afoul of the excessive fines clause, given the degree of culpability of the sophisticated and experienced defendant, the relationship between the penalty and the harm, and sanctions imposed in other cases which the court analyzed.

The court pointed out that one of the “primary purposes of Medicare is to promote beneficiary access to high-quality medical care.”  The court also noted the importance of whistleblower claims, citing Congressional findings to the effect that “more effective fraud detection will only occur if changes are made at the basic employee level, to halt the so-called 'conspiracy of silence.'"

There are many health care services which have provider supervision requirements in many venues.  Health care providers are well-advised to diligently review, implement, and document compliance with the supervision requirements that apply to them.

IRS Offers Businesses "Fresh Start" on Classification of Workers

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the United States Department of Labor, and various states have joined together in an effort to crack down on the misclassification of employees as independent contractors.  Despite the fact that the definition of an employee for federal tax purposes has not been substantively amended, the IRS is getting more aggressive about pushing employment status for workers, including some that have long been viewed as independent contractors.

In concert with the increased investigation and enforcement of laws pertaining to worker classification, the IRS has launched a new program that will enable many employers to resolve past worker classification issues by paying a fraction of its employment tax liability in exchange for a prospective reclassification of independent contractors as employees.  “Designed to increase tax compliance and reduce burden for employers by providing greater certainty for employers, workers and the government,” the new IRS Voluntary Classification Settlement Program (VCSP), also called the “Fresh Start Initiative”, was announced only two days after state and federal officials jointly proclaimed an agreement to work together to curb the practice of misclassifying employees.  To be eligible to participate in the VCSP, an employer must:

  • consistently have treated workers in the past as non-employees;
  • have filed all required 1099s for those workers for the previous three years; and
  • not currently be under audit by the IRS, the Department of Labor, or a state agency concerning the classification of workers.

Employers can apply for the program by filing Form 8952, Application for Voluntary Classification Settlement Program, at least sixty days before they wish to begin treating the workers as employees, and the IRS will then determine whether or not the business qualifies.  The IRS maintains absolute discretion to deny an application into VCSP, even if the employer satisfies all eligibility requirements.  If an employer is accepted into the program:

  • it will pay only 10% of the amount of employment taxes that would have otherwise been due on the compensation paid to the workers during the most recent tax year;
  • no interest or penalties will be due;
  • the business will not be audited on payroll taxes related to those workers for prior years; and
  • participating employers will, for the first three years under VCSP, be subject to a special six-year statute of limitations rather than the usual three years that generally applies to payroll taxes for each of the first, second, and third years after it reclassifies its employees.

The program permits a business to reclassify some, or all, of its workers.  However, once it chooses to reclassify certain workers as employees, all workers in that same class must be treated as employees for employment tax purposes.

Please keep in mind that the “amnesty” contained in the VCSP applies to federal employment taxes only.  Depending upon whether state taxing agencies adopt a similar “amnesty” program, an employer participating in the VCSP could invite exposure under state tax laws.

U.S. Supreme Court Expands Retaliation Protection for Employees

Earlier this year, the United States Supreme Court expanded the scope of protection under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII) to cover claims of associational retaliation.  In Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S.Ct. 863 (2011), the Court ruled that, in certain situations, Title VII allows an employee who has not personally engaged in “protected activity” under the statute to bring a retaliation claim against an employer who has taken an adverse employment action against that individual.

In Thompson, both the petitioner (Thompson) and his fiancé worked for the respondent, North American Stainless (NAS).  Shortly after Thompson’s fiancé filed a charge alleging gender discrimination against NAS, Thompson was fired by NAS, allegedly in retaliation for the “protected activity” of his fiancé.  A federal district court and an appellate court both dismissed Thompson’s retaliation claim, reasoning that because he had not engaged in a protected activity recognized under Title VII, he could not bring a retaliation claim under the statute.

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decisions, noting that “Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision prohibits any employer action that well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”  Finding it “obvious” that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity if she knew that her fiancé would be fired, the Court held that Thompson’s firing fell within Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.  Furthermore, because Thompson was not an “accidental victim of the retaliation - collateral damage, so to speak, of the employer’s unlawful act,” he was well within the “zone of interest” sought to be protected by Title VII.

The Court, however, limited the holding to the facts of the Thompson case by declining to identify a “fixed class of relationships for which third-party reprisals are unlawful.”  Nevertheless, it did observe that “firing a close family member will almost always meet the [applicable] standard, and inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance will almost never do.”  In essence, while cloaking individuals related to persons who engage in Title VII protected activity within the statute’s protective shield, the Court left it to the lower courts, at least for now, to define the class of protected relationships entitled to Title VII coverage.  Until the lower courts undertake this task, employers must recognize the potential liability for taking action against not only those who have engaged in protected activity under Title VII, but also in taking action against others who have a relationship with a person who engaged in protected activity.

If You Let Your Employment Agreement Lapse, You May Become an At-Will Employee

When you joined the staff of your employer’s company, you made sure to protect your rights pursuant to an employment agreement.  Now the expiration date of your employment agreement is fast approaching and you’re wondering if there is really a need to push for a written extension.  You may think that as long as you continue your employment, you’ll be protected by the provisions of your contract, even if it technically expires.  If you work in New York, making such an assumption could cost you down the road. 

In 2008, the New York Court of Appeals issued a decision in Goldman v. White Plains Center for Nursing Care, LLC , 11 NY3d 173, that every employer and employee needs to keep in mind, especially when it comes time to renew an employment agreement.   At issue in the case was whether the expiration of a two-year employment contract gave rise to successive one-year implied contracts when employees continued working for the employer without a new agreement.  The plaintiff relied on a common law rule that recognizes an inference that parties intend to renew an employment agreement for an additional year where the employee continues to work after the expiration of an employment contract.  In other words, the plaintiff tried to argue that the employment agreement automatically renewed even though the parties had not executed a written extension.  The Court noted that the parties agreed the contract memorialized their understandings, could only be modified in writing, and expired on a specified date absent additional negotiations for a new agreement.  It stated that the application of the common law rule would contradict the express terms of the contract.  The Court held the common law rule could not be used to imply that there was mutual and silent assent to automatic contract renewal when an agreement imposed an express obligation on the parties to enter into a new contract to extend the term of employment.  Hence, plaintiff's employment became an at-will arrangement upon the expiration of the agreement. 

So what’s the lesson here?  If you have an employment agreement in place that provides valuable protection, be sure to obtain a written extension prior to the expiration of the agreement.  If you are an employer that wants to avoid uncertainty regarding the application of the common law rule, you can specify in your employment contracts that continuation of the employment relationship after the expiration of the contractual period will result in at-will employment status.

NLRB Reverses "Facebook Firing"--Social Media Postings as Protected Concerted Activity for Non-unionized Employees

employee computer

On September 2, 2011, a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) administrative judge required the reinstatement of five employees fired under an anti-bullying policy, who had posted comments on Facebook criticizing the job performance of a sixth employee. In Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., the judge determined that the nonprofit employer had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which applies to “protected concerted activity” even in the absence of a  unionized workplace. 

In general, protected concerted activity is found when the activity in which the employee engaged is done with or on the authority of other employees (not solely by or on behalf of  an individual employee).  Protected concerted activity may include group discussions--which happen easily on Facebook if a co-worker clicks “like” or "comment"--if those discussions are related to the “terms and conditions of employment.”  Section 7 of the NLRA protects joint employee activity for “mutual aid or protection” of employees, including group discussions of job performance, staffing, and workload, as well as disparaging comments about supervisors, coworkers, and competitors. The fact the discussion occurs on an internet social media platform is irrelevant.

This recent decision was discussed in the Report of the Acting General Counsel Concerning Social Media Cases, (dated as of August 18, 2011) (the "Report"). It is one of fourteen social media cases decided within the last year. The Report contains factual details and analysis of the protected nature of employee internet activity, and is useful to employers and human resources professionals seeking to understand the problematic enforceability of their social media policies and restrictions.  

Specific examples from the Report are illustrative of the developing standards.

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Should Hospitals Treat Part-Time Medical Directors as Employees or Independent Contractors?

doctorThere is a long-standing practice in the health care industry to treat certain physicians, in particular medical directors, as independent contractors.  However, over the years the IRS has issued a number of rulings in which it has determined that these “typical” relationships are that of employer-employee.  Although the IRS modified its test in 2006  for determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists, which could affect these rulings, many industry analysts believe that the IRS will abide by its prior rulings. To date there have been no private letter rulings issued that would signal a change in the IRS’s position.

In 1995, the IRS issued two private letter rulings that are instructive with regard to medical directors and physicians.  In both, the physicians appeared to have entered into fairly standard medical directorship agreements with a nursing home or hospital, whereby the physicians maintained a separate private practice, provided administrative services to the nursing home or hospital, and received a monthly stipend for their services.  Both the nursing home and the hospital cited the long-standing industry practice of treating medical directors as independent contractors.

In the first ruling, the IRS cited the following factors to support its determination that the medical director was an employee:

  • The physician provided the nursing home with services that differed from those provided in the physician’s private medical practice;
  • The nursing home had the right to control the activities of the physician (i.e., the physician was required to be available for emergencies, to teach in-service classes, and to be at the facility 12 to 14 hours per month);
  • The physician was paid a set monthly compensation and, therefore, was not in a position to realize a profit or incur a loss as a result of performing the services;
  • The physician’s services were required by regulation and were necessary for the nursing home to provide high-quality medical care;
  • The physician and nursing home had a continuing relationship that required the physician to personally render the designated services and work a set number of hours per month;
  • The physician was required to submit monthly written reports to the nursing home;
  • The nursing home paid for the physician’s business expenses, including professional seminars and conferences; and
  • Both the physician and the nursing home retained the right to terminate the relationship with 60 days written notice.

In the second private letter ruling, the medical director was not required to work a set number of hours or submit regular reports to the hospital, did not receive office space in which to provide services, and was not reimbursed for expenses.  Nevertheless, the IRS concluded that the medical director was an employee of the hospital.  

Bottom line, if your hospital compensates physicians for medical director services, a careful analysis should be conducted to ensure your institution does not run afoul of the tax law.

Cancun No Paradise for Employee on FMLA Leave

beachSummer may bring to mind beaches, sun tan oil, and vacations with family and friends.  In the warm-weather months, many employees would rather spend time in the great outdoors than in the office.  However, for one employee, pursuing fun in the sun ended up costing her a job because she took her vacation while she was on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).

In Pelligrino v. Communication Workers of America (W.D. Pa., May 18, 2011), the plaintiff was employed as a clerical worker by the Communications Workers of America (CWA), a labor union.  She requested leave to undergo a medical procedure.  In response to the request, CWA informed the employee that it would approve her FMLA leave request and that the FMLA leave would run concurrently with paid sick leave.  The employee scheduled her surgery, and both her unpaid FMLA leave and paid sick leave began.

Under CWA’s work rules, an employee utilizing sick leave was required to “remain in the immediate vicinity” of her home unless she was seeking treatment, attending to “ordinary and necessary activities directly related to personal or family needs,” or had received express permission from the employer.  Shortly after undergoing surgery, and without permission from her employer, the employee traveled to Cancun, Mexico, staying for approximately one week.  When CWA officials learned of the employee’s trip, it terminated her employment.

Thereafter, the employee brought a lawsuit against CWA for interference with her FMLA rights.  The employer contended that it terminated her employment not because she was on FMLA leave but because she took an unapproved trip to Cancun while utilizing sick leave, thereby violating its leave policies and work rules.

While the court agreed that the employee’s leave was FMLA-protected, it nevertheless dismissed her claim, determining that CWA did not interfere with her FMLA leave.  The court reasoned that the employee’s conduct would have been improper whether or not FMLA leave was involved, and this was particularly so where the employer’s policy was designed to stop FMLA abuse.  In short, the court held that the FMLA does not shield an employee from termination if the employee is involved in misconduct related to the use of FMLA leave.

Employee or Independent Contractor? How Do I Know?

listIn Part One of my series on employee misclassification, I discussed the penalties associated with improperly classifying an employee as an independent contractor.  In Part Two of this series, I provide information you can use to determine if a person should be classified as an employee or an independent contractor. 

The IRS uses an 11-factor test to determine if someone is an employee.  Below is a checklist you can use, which is based on this test.  A "yes" response to a question strengethens the position that an individual is an employee, while a "no" response strengethens the position that an individual is an independent contractor.  When using the term "business" in the checklist, I am referring to the entity paying the individual for his/her services. 

  • Are there instructions provided by the business to the individual pertaining to when, where, and how the work is to be done?
  • Is there training provided to the individual?
  • Are work hours set by the business?
  • Is the individual required to perform the services personally?
  • Is the business in charge of hiring, firing, supervising, or paying others who will substantially assist the individual in performing the work?
  • Does the business require oral or written reports on a regular basis?
  • Does the business provide tools and materials necessary to perform the services?
  • Does the business tell the individual where to purchase supplies and materials if not already provided?
  • Is the work to be performed at the business' location?
  • Is the compensation paid on a regularly recurring basis (hourly, weekly, or monthly)?
  • Is the individual paid a fixed compensation amount?
  • Does the business reimburse the individual's business and/or travel expenses?
  • Does the individual work for only the business?
  • Does the business provide benefits such as insurance, pension, or paid leave?
  • Does the business anticipate a continuing relationship, rather than based on a project or period?
  • Does the individual have a right to end his/her relationship with the business at any time without incurring liability?

While this checklist is meant to provide some helpful guidance, you should always contact a knowledgeable attorney if you have questions about proper employee classification. 

$20 Million Settlement of EEOC Disability Employment Discrimination Suit; Absence Policies Must Comply with ADA

Empty DeskOn July 7, 2011, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a press release announcing that Verizon will pay $20 million in the largest, nationwide disability discrimination lawsuit in EEOC history.  The basis of the claim against Verizon and a number of its subsidiaries was that Verizon’s attendance policy disciplined employees for all absences, failing to provide reasonable accommodations for employees whose absences were caused by disabilities covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 

In a Consent Decree now awaiting judicial approval, Verizon and the EEOC agreed to the following procedure for Verizon to determine if a leave of absence should be given to an employee and treated as an ADA accommodation:

  • Evaluate whether the individual employee has a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, as defined by the ADA;
  • Determine whether the absence was caused by a disability;
  • Learn if the employee or someone on the employee’s behalf requested through company procedures a period of time off from work due to disability;
  • Assess whether the employee’s absences are not expected to be unreasonably unpredictable, repeated, frequent or chronic;
  • Determine if there is a definite or reasonably certain period of time off that the employee would need because of a disability; and
  • Decide that the employee's need for time off from work as a reasonable accommodation does not pose a significant difficulty or expense for the company’s business.

Employers should examine their leave of absence policies to ensure they are drafted in a manner compliant with ADA regulations, and should train managers to implement these practical steps.

Further detail about the EEOC final regulations implementing the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act (which took effect May 24, 2011) can be found in a related blog post.

Can Owners Be Considered Employees Under The ADEA?

Elderly crossingThe  Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) forbids employment discrimination against anyone over the age of 40 in the United States (29 U.S.C. Section 631(a)).  The ADEA contains a broad ban against age discrimination and covers employers that have 20 or more employees.  The statute specifically prohibits discrimination in hiring, promotions, wages, termination of employment, or layoffs.  Additionally, the ADEA has prohibited mandatory retirement in most sectors since 1978. 

Exceptions to older workers being covered under the ADEA are:

  • When age is essential to a specific position, the ADEA does not apply.  This is also known as a “bona fide occupational qualification”;
  • Police and firefighter jobs;
  • Executives in high policy-making positions reaching age 65 may be obligated to retire if their annual pension benefits are $44,000 or more;
  • Tenured university faculty; and
  • Federal employees in air traffic control and law enforcement jobs.

Each state may also have laws prohibiting age discrimination.  The ADEA does not preempt state law when state law is broader than the ADEA.  In cases where state law is less restrictive than the ADEA, employers must comply with the more strict federal law.  The primary New York State statute prohibiting age discrimination is the Human Rights Law.  Currently under the Human Rights Law there is no maximum age limit for discrimination purposes. 

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issues a Compliance Manual and, as amended in May 2000, it states that “In most circumstances, an individual is only protected if he or she was an employee at the time of the alleged discrimination, rather than an independent contractor, partner, or other non-employee.”  The EEOC Compliance Manual also states that “In most circumstances, individuals who are partners, officers, members of boards of directors, or major shareholders will not qualify as employees.”  In determining whether a partner, officer, member of board of directors, or a major corporate shareholder is an employee or an employer, the EEOC looks collectively at the following six factors:

  1. Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and regulations of the individual’s work;
  2. Whether the organization supervises the individual’s work and, if so, to what extent;
  3. Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization;
  4. Whether the individual is able to influence the organization and, if so, to what extent;
  5. Whether the parties intended the individual to be an employee, as expressed in written  agreements or contracts; and
  6. Whether the individual shares in profits, losses, and liabilities of the organization.

The question of whether a “partner” in a partnership or a “shareholder” in a corporation is an “employer” or an “employee” under the ADEA is not always an easy one and must be determined on a case by case basis.  The EEOC and courts use the six factors above to analyze each case.  EEOC investigators are directed in every case to determine whether the individual acts independently and participates in the management of the organization or is subject to control of the organization.  For instance, in large partnerships or corporations, some of the partners and shareholders may be found to be employees if the EEOC determines that the control of the organization is vested in a smaller group of partners or shareholders.

The moral of the story is that just because an individual is an owner does not mean that such individual will not be considered an employee under the ADEA or the New York Human Rights Law, thereby affording him or her the protections under those laws.

Employee or Independent Contractor? Why Does it Matter?

fighting over moneyBusiness owners often face the question of whether to treat someone who works for them as an employee or an independent contractor.   In the first part of this two part series, I will discuss the penalties that can be imposed for misclassifying a worker.  In part two of this series,  I will provide some guidance on how to determine if a worker is an employee or independent contractor. 

The IRS uncovers worker misclassification through the audit process.  An IRS audit typically includes a review of at least three past years of tax returns, but it may cover earlier years as well.  Back taxes, penalties, and interest can be collected from a corporation and/or from its responsible persons, including officers and directors.  Potential assessments for misclassification include the following: 

  • The employer share of social security (FICA) taxes that should have been paid with regard to the worker;
  • One-fifth of the worker’s share of FICA taxes that should have been withheld from his or her wages;
  • One and one-half percent of total compensation paid to the worker, in lieu of the federal income tax withholding that should have taken place; and
  • Any payments that should have been paid under the Federal Unemployment Tax (FUTA).  However, a tax-exempt employer may be exempt from FUTA. 

These amounts, to which interest and penalties can be added, total approximately 11% of the total wages paid to the individual during the years audited.  If the IRS determines that the decision to treat an employee as an independent contractor was intentional, the employer’s liability can be doubled.  There may also be additional amounts due as a result of the failure to withhold state income tax.

Misclassification of employees is an issue that has also received some attention on the state level.  In 2007, former Governor Spitzer created the Joint Enforcement Task Force on Employee Misclassification (JETF).  JETF was created to strengthen classification enforcement and avoid duplication across state agencies by sharing relevant information, coordinating investigations, and educating the business community as well as the public.  In 2010, JETF identified over 18,500 instances of employee misclassification, discovered more than $314 million in unreported wages, assessed over $10.5 million in unemployment taxes, over $2 million in unpaid wages, and over $800,000 in workers’ compensation fines and penalties.  On June 8, 2010, the New York State Labor Commissioner announced the results of two enforcement sweeps carried out by JETF in the construction industry.  Four subcontractors were found to owe over $60,000 in overtime wages, liquidated damages, and penalties.    

The penalties for worker misclassification are real and thoughtful consideration needs to be paid to this issue before a business owner engages the services of a worker.

How Do You Handle a Non-Negotiable Covenant Not to Compete?

If you are a physician joining a medical group or a hospital staff, chances are high that a non-competition clause will be included in your employment agreement.  Physicians are often told that the covenant not to compete is non-negotiable.  While that may be true, there are other provisions you can negotiate to protect yourself in the event the agreement is terminated down the road. 

  • Term and Termination – Look carefully at the term and termination provisions in your contract.  If the term of your contract is three years, but either party can terminate on 60 days notice, you actually have a 60 day contract.  Negotiating a longer notice period will give you more time to plan you next career move if your employer decides to terminate your agreement and the non-compete forces you to move out of the area.
  • Severance Payments – You can ask your employer for a severance package and use the additional compensation to relocate if necessary.
  • Renewal Provision – If the non-compete in your employment agreement applies upon its expiration, you can ask for (i) an automatic renewal provision that can only be avoided upon notice from one party to the other; (ii) a requirement that mandates both parties negotiate the terms of a new agreement prior to the end of the term; or (iii) a provision that requires the employer provide notice to you if it does not intend to renew the contract.  All these options will give you time to plan your next steps. 
  • Buy-out  – You can ask your employer for an option to buy-out your non-compete.  This type of provision will allow you to continue practicing without any restriction, provided you are willing to pay the price.

Non-competition clauses can have a significant impact on your life and your ability to practice, so be sure to read them carefully and engage qualified counsel to assist you and protect your interests.

Can an Employer Recover Severance Payments From a Terminated Employee Without a Clawback Provision?

Compliance investigations sometimes show that previously terminated hospital executives, who may be receiving substantial severance payments, did not take the steps necessary to ensure legally compliant conduct or implicitly or explicitly condoned illegal activity.  These difficult circumstances result in hospital boards asking counsel whether they should cease severance payments to the terminated executive and/or sue to recover payments already made. magnifying glass over money

The conventional wisdom is that the hospital has no remedy unless the terminated executive’s contract contained a so-called “clawback” provision.  The conventional wisdom is wrong.  Even in the absence of a clawback provision, New York law permits the suspension of payments and the recovery of compensation already paid if the hospital is able to bring the executive’s conduct within the common-law doctrine of the “faithless servant.” 

Grounded in agency law, the “faithless servant” doctrine is a somewhat dormant but recently reinvigorated common-law rule that may be used to recover paid compensation from a terminated employee, even in the absence of a clawback provision.  Agents must be loyal to their employers, are prohibited from acting in any manner inconsistent with their agency, and are at all times bound to exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty in exercising their duties.  See Phansalkar v. Andersen, Weinroth & Co., Inc., 344 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2003).  Those who are faithless in the performance of services are generally not entitled to their compensation.  Principals are entitled to recover compensation paid to their unfaithful agents, even if the services were beneficial to the principal, or the principal suffered no provable damage as a result of the agent’s breach of fidelity.  Id.

Once it has been determined that an employee has been “faithless,” the next issue is the extent or measure of the forfeiture.  The rule is that the “faithless servant” forfeits all compensation paid after the first act of disloyalty.  Id. at 208.  This includes both salary and severance. 

Because the faithless servant doctrine exists independent of and outside the provisions of the employment contract, the hospital would not have to prove “cause.”  The hospital would have to show that the executive acted in a manner inconsistent with the agency.  While this may be a difficult standard to meet, depending on the circumstances, the faithless servant doctrine gives a hospital board an avenue to pursue severance and other compensation paid to the terminated executive that is independent of the employment contract and not limited by the lack of a clawback provision.  Whether it is in the hospital’s best interest to bring such a suit is a subject for another day. 

What Do the EEOC's New ADA Regulations Mean for Employers?

On March 24, 2011, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") released its long awaited final regulations implementing the Americans With Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADAAA").  The final regulations were published in the Federal Register on March 25, 2011 and  become effective on May 24, 2011. 

wheelchairThe ADA’s definition of a “disability” remains unchanged under the ADAAA.  A “disability” is still defined as (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, (2) a record of such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.  However, the ADAAA makes significant changes in how these terms are to be interpreted, and the EEOC’s final regulations implement those changes.

The following is a list of key points in the final regulations:

  • Principles for determination of disability. The final regulations set forth a list of nine “rules of construction” in determining whether an impairment “substantially limits a major life activity.”  For instance, an impairment does not need to prevent or significantly restrict a major life activity to be considered “substantially limiting.”  Except for ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses, “mitigating measures” like medication and assistive devices must not be considered when determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.  The term “substantially limits” is to be construed broadly to the maximum extent allowable under the ADA. 
  • Major life activities.  The final regulations provide a “non-exhaustive” list of examples of “major life activities,” such as caring for oneself, seeing, hearing, eating, walking, sitting, reaching, bending, speaking, breathing, reading, concentrating, and interacting with others.  In addition, the final regulations clarify that the term “major life activities” includes “major bodily functions,” such as functions of the immune system, bladder functions, neurological functions, and respiratory functions.
  • “Regarded as” element more easily established.  The ADAAA expands the “regarded as” disabled analysis by prohibiting discrimination based on an individual’s impairment or an employer’s perception of an impairment.  The focus is on how the individual was treated rather than on what the employer believes about the nature of an individual’s impairment. 
  • Reasonable accommodations.  The final regulations clarify that an individual must meet either the “actual” or “record of” definitions of a disability in order to qualify for a reasonable accommodation.  An individual that meets only the “regarded as” definition of a disability is not entitled to a reasonable accommodation.

What does this mean for employers? 

The EEOC’s final regulations expand the protections of the ADA, largely because more individuals will fall under the protection of the statute as having a “disability.”  While this may not have as much impact upon New York employers, given the very broad definition of a “disability” under the New York Executive Law, there are additional remedies (such as recovery of attorneys’ fees) available under the ADA that cannot be recovered under New York State law. 

Going forward, employers need to focus more on accommodation and not on whether a person is considered disabled.  Employers should engage in an interactive process with the individual requesting or appearing to need an accommodation.  Individualized assessments of accommodations should be conducted, and the accommodation process should be clearly documented.  Examples of documentation can include whether the requested accommodation is reasonable and whether the accommodation can be provided without an undue hardship on the employer. 

Can Owners of Entities Be Personally Responsible for Unpaid Wages in New York State?

Section 630 of the New York Business Corporation Law (“BCL”) states in relevant part:

The ten largest shareholders as determined by the fair market value of their beneficial interest as of the beginning of the period during which the unpaid services referred to in this section are performed, of every corporation…shall jointly and severally be personally liable for all debts, wages or salaries due and owing to any of its laborers, servants or employees…

The statute seems to make it clear, it says “the ten largest shareholders…of every corporation” which should mean it applies to every corporation in New York state.  Not so.http://mrg.bz/exNaF0

The law certainly covers corporations formed under New York State law, but what about limited liability companies and foreign corporations formed elsewhere and authorized to do business in New York?

In a 1935 case, the New York Court of Appeals (our highest court) held that Section 71 of the Stock Corporation Law, the predecessor to BCL Section 630, applied only to shareholders of corporations that were formed pursuant to New York law.  Shareholders of corporations formed in other states and authorized to do business in New York, were held to have no such obligation to their employees pursuant to New York law.

There are subsequent cases from the lower courts confirming that this holding based upon Stock Corporation Law Section 71 applies to Section 630 of the BCL.

The New York Limited Liability Company Law (“LLCL”), which was enacted in New York effective October 24, 1994, contains many of the same provisions found in the BCL.  In fact, many of the sections of the LLCL have the same paragraph number and virtually same wording as in the BCL.  However, there is no Section 630 or anything similar in the LLCL. 

In fact, the LLCL provides at Section 609 the following:

Neither a member of a limited liability company, a manager of a limited liability company managed by a manager or managers nor an agent of a limited liability company is liable for any debts, obligations or liabilities of the limited liability company or each other, whether arising in tort, contract or otherwise, solely by reason of being such member, manager or agent or acting in such  capacities or participating in the conduct of the business of the limited liability company.

This Section goes on to require that, for a member of a limited liability company to be liable for LLC debts in their capacity as a member, there needs to be a statement to such effect contained in the Articles of Organization and the members to be held so liable have to specifically consent in writing to such provision in order to be bound.

In today’s environment it’s not likely that any member of an LLC would consent in writing to be liable for employee wages.  Unless they do, LLC members in New York are not responsible.

It is interesting that state law would treat owners of entities so differently when considering the rights of employees to be paid.  While no one ever expects to enter into business and not pay their employees, it happens.  This is another point to take into account when choosing the form of entity for your business.

Decision in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Strengthens Employee Protections Under FLSA

Imagine the following: An employee comes to you, the HR manager, complaining about location of a time clock in the company’s plant. He tells you verbally that placing the time clock between the area where the workers put on and take off their work-related protective gear and the area where they carry out their assigned tasks is illegal under the Fair Standards Labor Act, but he does not submit a written complaint. The President of the company then comes to you and tells you that he wants to fire that same employee because he has failed to clock in and out after repeated warnings. Would there be any risk in firing this employee? If you said no, you would be wrong.

According to a recent decision by the US Supreme Court, an oral complaint of a violation of the FSLA is protected conduct under the Act’s anti-retaliation provision. If you decide you need to terminate an employee after the employee files an FSLA complaint, whether written or verbal, you need to tread with caution to protect your company against a lawsuit for unlawful retaliation.

The ClockFSLA contains an anti-retaliation provision that prohibits an employer from firing an employee because the employee has reported illegal working conditions or practices. At issue in Kasten v. Saint Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation, was the type of complaint that qualifies for protection under the FSLA. Under the Act, employers may not “discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint . . . related to the Act. . . ” The Court held that “filed any complaint” includes oral as well as written complaints. According to the decision, any other interpretation would undermine the Act’s basic objective to prohibit detrimental labor conditions. The Court noted that to gain protection under the anti-retaliation provision of the FSLA, “the oral complaint must be sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection.”

Lessons for all employers

• Develop and implement a policy to handle all FSLA complaints filed by employees, whether oral or written.

• If an employee files an oral FSLA complaint, be sure to memorialize the complaint in writing as well as the actions taken to address the complaint.

• If you decide to terminate an employee after he/she files an FSLA complaint, be sure to seek advice from legal counsel well-versed in employment law.

Structure Separation Pay to meet IRC 409 exceptions

money with hand

In response to alleged abuses by Enron executives, Congress introduced sweeping restrictions on deferred compensation. These restrictions were implemented by lengthy, complicated technical regulations issued pursuant to Internal Revenue Code Section 409A, and are enforced by significant penalties. Compliance with these regulations is often a concern in physician and executive compensation agreements and in employment termination policies and practices.

In many cases, separation pay can be structured to avoid the application of Section 409A so that it does not fit the definition of “deferred compensation”. The payments would have to fit within one of the following exceptions:

  1. Short-term deferral
  2. Separation pay safe-harbor
  3. The amount of separation pay is de minimis (less than or equal to amount permitted for  401(k) for that year)

The short-term deferral exception

Payments to be made not later than two and a half months after the end of the year in which a "substantial risk of forfeiture" lapses (after the right to the payment "vests") are not deferred compensation.

The separation pay safe-harbor exception

Any payment that qualifies under the separation pay safe-harbor contained in the Section 409A regulations is not considered to be deferred compensation subject to Section 409A. This exception is available for separation pay that:

  • Is paid only in the case of an involuntary termination;
  • Does not exceed, in the aggregate, the lesser of:
    • twice the employees' annualized compensation for the prior calendar year; or
    • twice the compensation limit in effect under Code Section 401(a)(17)—currently, such limit is $245,000 (so twice the limit is $490,000 for 2011).
  • Is paid in full by the end of the second calendar year after the separation from service.

An "involuntary termination of employment" includes being fired by the employer, and it also includes a termination instigated by the employee, provided that there is acceptable "good reason" associated with the decision to leave. The regulations have safe-harbor "good reason" standards, and also a general standard depending on facts and circumstances which would amount to constructive termination

De Minimis  exception

Certain de minimis amounts under a separation pay arrangement as are not subject to Section 409A so long as the payments in the aggregate do not exceed the applicable limit under Internal Revenue Code Section 402(g) for the year of separation (this is the deferral limit applicable to 401(k) plans and other defined contribution retirement plans, whcih was $16,500 for 2011).   This is intended to avoid the application of Section 409A to small, incidental benefits under a separation pay arrangement.

In the alternative, the separation pay can be structured to comply with the rules of Section 409A.

New York Wage Theft Protection Act Imposes New Notice Requirements on NY Employers

paperworkSince October 2009, employers have been required under New York Labor Law § 195(1) to provide all new hires with written notification of their rate of pay, overtime rate (if applicable) and regular payday.  Moreover, employers have been required to secure a written acknowledgment from each new hire confirming receipt of this information. The Wage Theft Protection Act (“WTPA”), which goes into effect on April 12, 2011, significantly increases the notice requirements under Labor Law § 195(1), both in terms of the information that must be given to employees and the frequency with which it must be provided.  

With respect to new hires, employers will now be required to provide written disclosure of the following additional information:

  • The basis of the employee’s rate of pay (i.e., hourly, daily, weekly, commission, etc.)
  • Allowances claimed against the minimum wage (tips, meal or lodging allowances)
  • The name (including any d/b/a names), address and telephone number of the employer
  • Any other information the Commissioner of Labor deems necessary 

This new notice must be provided in both English and the language identified by the employee as his or her primary language.  The notification must be signed and dated by the employee and retained by the employer for at least six years.

With respect to current employees, the WTPA mandates that employers provide the notice described above by February 1, 2012, and on or before February 1 in each subsequent year.  As is the case with new hires, the employee’s acknowledgment of such notification must be signed and dated by him or her and retained by the employer for at least six years.  In addition, employers must now provide the following information along with every wage payment (some of which were previously required): 

  • Dates of work covered
  • Employer’s address and telephone number
  • Gross wages
  • Net wages
  • Deductions
  • Allowances against minimum wage
  • Regular rate of pay and manner in which it is paid (hourly, salary, commission, etc.) and, for non-exempt employees, the overtime rate of pay and the number of regular and overtime hours worked

The WTPA provides greater protection and rights to employees who have complained about wage and hour violations or whom the employer believes to have made such complaints. 

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Who Gets Paid for Snow Days?

Snow dayDuring this year’s rough winter, many employers had their businesses impacted by the adverse weather conditions and were confronted with questions as to how to account for employees’ missed time from work.  Now that spring has arrived, it may be a good time for employers who have not done so to review and update their inclement weather policies.

For non-exempt employees, compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) is relatively simple.  Non-exempt employees must be paid only for hours worked.  The FLSA does not require an employer to pay non-exempt employees when they do not come to work due to inclement weather.  In addition, because the Department of Labor has ruled that an employer may give its employees vacation time and then require that such vacation time be taken on a specific day(s), an employer can require a non-exempt employee to use his or her leave time for a weather-related absence (even in less than full-day increments).

The rules are a bit more complicated for exempt employees, who must be paid on a salaried basis.  The general rule is that exempt employees must be paid their full salary for any week in which they perform work.  Partial-day deductions from an exempt employee’s salary are not allowed.  As a result, when an exempt employee is absent for less than a full day, his or her guaranteed salary must be paid even if the employee has no accrued vacation or leave time.  To make such a deduction would jeopardize the employee’s exempt status.

The rules are different when the employer is open for business, and the employee is absent for at least a full day.  Under the FLSA, deductions from an employee’s leave time or salary may be made for absences of one or more full days for “personal reasons” other than sickness or accident.  When an employer is open for business and the employee chooses not to report to work, the Department of Labor considers this an absence for a “personal reason” not attributed to sickness.  Deductions from salary may be made, provided they are taken in full-day increments.  By way of example, if an exempt employee is absent for one-and-one half days due to adverse weather conditions, the employer may deduct for the one full-day absence and must pay the exempt employee a full day’s pay for the partial day worked.

Finally, if the employer closes operations due to the weather, it cannot make deductions from an exempt employee’s salary.  However, if it provides paid leave, the employer may require employees to use accrued paid leave, either in partial-day or full-day increments.